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Abstract 
Whilst the encouragement to use disruption techniques in tackling organised crime, has emerged in 
government and law enforcement rhetoric, little is known about its implementation. This study examines 
how two UK police forces used a disruption approach to target 100 organised crime suspects. The findings 
show that a disruption approach offers a more dynamic and flexible approach when compared with 
traditional prosecution, and is popular with practitioners. However, further research is needed to 
understand the most effective method of delivery and the level of impact this approach can bring.  
 
 
Introduction 
Commentators have failed to find consensus over 
what constitutes Organized Crime (OC); indeed von 
Lampe (2015), has captured in the region of 150 
practitioner and academic definitions. For some the 
concept is epitomised by individuals who conform to 
strict hierarchical structures, and who use 
corruption, racketeering and violence to achieve 
criminal goals (UN Centre for Crime Prevention, 
2000). Others see a less obvious distinction between 
‘legitimate economic enterprise and the underworld 
of racketeering’ (Edwards & Gill, 2003:60), albeit 
those in superficially legitimate organisations ‘are 
almost always not dealt with, nor conceptualized, 
under the label organized crime’ (Standing; 
2003:38). Although this paper has insufficient space 
to develop these arguments it is important to state 
at this juncture that any empirical exploration in this 
discipline is affected by the limitation of its sample 
of chosen offenders.  
 
As an anchor to develop this study, the UK explain 
organised crime as involving, ‘..individuals, normally 
working with others, with the capacity and 
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capability to commit serious crime on a continuing 
basis, which includes elements of planning, control, 
and coordination, and benefits those involved’ 
(Home Office, 2011:5). Whilst the definitional 
debate rages on there appears a consensus that the 
substantive problem remains and appears to be 
gaining momentum (Lambsdorff, 2005). Although 
OC is not a new phenomenon, late modernity has 
significantly accelerated the opportunities for 
dedicated criminal entrepreneurs to thrive. So, 
whilst local crime is dampened by increased 
securitisation (Farrell et al. 2008), organised crime 
offenders are able to merge and fragment allowing 
them to exploit new opportunities presented 
through the accelerated movement of people 
commodities and services (Kirby and Penna, 2011). 
Through increased physical and vitual mobility OCGs 
are more able to connect and spread their influence 
using transnational criminal networks (Castells, 
1998), committing new crimes, as well as old crimes 
in new forms (Kirby, 2013:9). In relation to the 
phenomenon commentators generally agree on a 
number of points. First, organised crime is an issue 
that affects most societies across the world (Levi & 
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Maguire, 2012). Second, its impact affects all levels 
of society (Hobbs, 1998): at an international level 
the sustained level of corruption can allow failed 
states to endure, posing a threat to other nations; 
whilst at a transnational level the trafficking of 
people, illicit drugs, and firearms as well as cyber 
crime, have major effects on health, well-being and 
economic productivity (Levi, 2008:524). Further, at 
local level, residents see the impact of local 
intimidation and illicit commodity use. Bullock et al. 
(2009:2) found 70% of UK respondents felt the harm 
caused by organised crime to be ‘extremely serious 
or very serious’ and of increasing concern.  
 
There is a growing awareness of the level of harm 
created by organised crime. The UK National 
Security Strategy (NSS) and Strategic Defence and 
Security Review (SDSR), published in October 2010, 
highlighted the increase in organised crime as a ‘key 
risk to the UK’s national security’ (Home Office, 
2011:9). Also OC has a damaging effect on the 
economy and local community, estimated to cost 
the UK £10.7 billion as a result of illicit drugs supply, 
£8.9 billion in fraud and £1 billion in immigration 
crime (Mills et al., 2013:2). Coupled with this drug 
abuse contributes to around 1,800 deaths each year, 
indeed organised criminality is often targeted at the 
most vulnerable members of society (Home Office, 
2011:9). With such a significant and growing 
problem, governments and law enforcement 
agencies are under increasing pressure to tackle it 
effectively. 
 
Since 2007, there has been increasing effort to deal 
with OC within the 43 Police Forces of England & 
Wales. A national initiative has required all Police 
Forces to collate intelligence on OCGs within their 
geographic areas, using a standardized matrix that 
collects information across six categories: (i) level of 
injury caused, (ii) community impact, (iii) 
reputation/ political impact (public attitudes of 
police impartiality and effectiveness), (iv) level of 
cross border offending, (v) economic impact, and (vi) 
criminal capacity/ capability (Tusikov, 2012: 107). 
This cumulative ‘threat score’ highlights their 
perceived risk to society (Gilmour, 2008).  
However, OC offenders are often well motivated 
and resilient, therefore the question arises as to how 
policing tactics can make an impact? A recent Home 
Office study found OC offenders to be 
predominantly male, tending to show more 
persistent offending (Francis et al., 2013:20). Indeed 
the study argues these individuals do not ‘drift out 
of crime’ as regular offenders do, with 26% of 
offenders committing offences well into their 40s, 
displaying ‘less of the prolific, impulsive and chaotic 
offending behaviour of other types of persistent 
offender’ (Francis et al., 2013:40). They suggested 
that their peak age of offending is later than that of 
regular offenders with a small but significant 
proportion of these being ‘late starters’.  
 
To answer this challenge, during 2013 the UK 
publicised an updated Organised Crime strategy, 
which drew upon the lessons learnt from tackling 
terrorism. It was built upon the principle of the 4 P’s: 
prepare – reduce the impact of OC by developing 
political, economic, social and technical resilience; 
prevent – which attempts to stop individuals 
becoming involved in OC; protect – which target 
hardens the nations infrastructure to repel OC; and 
pursue - which uses prosecution and disruption to 
stop offending behaviour (Home Office, 2013). 
Within this strategy the concept of disruption has 
taken an increasingly central role. Indeed, the UK 
Home Secretary states in the executive summary of 
the latest OC strategy, “Our immediate priority is the 
work set out under Pursue to prosecute and 
relentlessly disrupt organised criminals and reduce 
the threat they pose” (Home Office 2013:7).  
 
It is perhaps useful at this stage to outline in more 
detail the tactics that can be used in furtherance of 
this approach. Traditional tactics have primarily 34  
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focused on prosecution, which has been increasingly 
criticised due to the time and cost associated with 
extensive investigations, especially when pursued 
across national boundaries (Kirby & Penna, 2010). 
Although an important element of justice, it has 
limited impact in terms of the reduction of crime, 
with the vacuum generated by incarcerated 
offenders quickly filled by others. Further the 
standard required to prosecute someone for an OC 
offence is high, allowing only a small level of 
proactive investigations to take place. Indeed the UK 
is estimated to have 6,000 organised crime groups 
(Home Office, 2011) with a previous estimate 
suggesting ‘less than 6% of these being targeted’ 
(HMIC 2006:5). This has made the risk of arrest low, 
which has resulted in governments and law 
enforcement agencies exploring more creative 
solutions. Situated at the opposite end of the 
continuum to prosecution is prevention, which aims 
to block the opportunity for the crime event taking 
place (Bullock et al. 2010), however in practice this 
remains difficult due to prevention not being 
particularly valued within police organisational 
culture (McLean & Hillier, 2011). This then leaves 
disruption, defined as a, ‘flexible, transitory, and 
dynamic tactic, which can be used more generally to 
make the environment hostile for the organised 
crime group….this approach focuses on disrupting 
the offender’s networks, lifestyles and routines’ 
(Kirby & Penna, 2010:205). Disruption therefore 
occupies the middle ground between enforcement 
(prosecution) and prevention as, whilst focusing on 
the offender and being action oriented, it looks to 
create more creative and sustainable solutions. 
Further it appears to provide better value for money 
than enforcement, as it provides the flexibility to 
prevent offending through any legitimate means, 
rather than focus attention on obtaining best 
evidence in relation to the primary OC offence the 
individual is suspected of.  
 
However this approach also highlights some critical 
questions, such as how the police identify the 
suspects and whether the tactics used are legitimate 
or amount to harassment.  The problems of 
disproportionate targeting and discriminatory 
policing practice are well-rehearsed in the literature 
and best exemplified by the ‘stop and search’ 
controversy.  Here, it has been shown that police 
target Black and Asian ethnic minorities under stop 
and search powers far in excess of any ‘reasonable 
suspicion’ of criminal activity (Equality and Human 
Rights Commission, 2010).  Moreover, whilst there 
has been some improvement in practice in some 
places since the (1999) Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, 
Joel Miller (2010: 968) still notes that, more than ten 
years on: 
 
the situation has become worse for black 
and Asian people. The relative chances of 
people in these groups being searched, 
compared to whites, have apparently 
increased. 
Clearly, there are genuine concerns about the 
grounds on which police officers make decisions 
about whom to target – here, in relation to stop and 
search but, by extension also in relation to 
disruption activities.  Additionally, there are critical 
scalar questions around whose activities are subject 
to disruption.  Whilst the police play a major role in 
disrupting ‘street crime’ but play little or no role in 
disrupting ‘suite crime’.  This raises obvious 
questions about whether organised crime in 
corporations – multi-national companies cheating 
environmental regulations, insurance industries and 
banks ‘mis-selling’ (fraudulent?) products, and so on 
– are somehow above disruption, leaving the police 
as enforcers of street justice but not social justice.  
Notwithstanding that these are serious and 
troubling issues it is not in the scope of this paper to 
address them in the detail they merit.  Others have 
provided critical overviews of these ‘white collar’ 
and corporate crimes to sometimes startling effect 35  
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(see, inter alia, Green, 2006; Ferrante et al, 2009; 
van Baar & Huisman, 2012).  Here, we are concerned 
with operational issues in an effort to tease out 
whether or not disruption ‘works’ and the 
difficulties measuring success.  With this is mind, the 
paper will examine how Police Forces implement a 
disruption approach in the UK. Examining two UK 
policing areas it explores the degree to which this 
approach is being implemented, the level of 
consistency, to which it is applied, and the impact it 
makes on the offenders concerned. 
 
Methodology 
Between 2013-14, vetted researchers, worked 
alongside two Police Forces, in separate regions 
within the North of England. Whilst one researcher 
worked within one of the operational divisions of 
Force 1, a further researcher worked at HQ in Force 
2. A further researcher worked between the two 
areas. The Forces were fundamentally different in 
size and geographic demographics: Force 1 covered 
a highly populated urban area, whilst Force 2 was 
predominantly rural. Both areas were explicit in the 
use of a disruption approach, indeed the first had as 
its objective to create the ‘most hostile environment 
for Organised Criminals and their families’, which 
was underpinned by the principles of working in 
partnership; sharing intelligence with partners; 
improving public confidence; and to do ‘what 
works’.  
 
The study used both quantitative and qualitative 
research methods. Primarily content analysis of 
secondary data held on both the local police force 
database and UK Police National Computer (PNC) 
was conducted. At the time of this study, the 
operational unit in Force 1 were targeting 43 
individuals, with information available for 38. In 
Force 2 there were 62 suspects available for 
analysis. As was mentioned earlier, there are 
limitations to any organised crime offender sample 
as it often relies on observations, interviews and the 
retrieval of stored information (von Lampe, 
2012:181), generally associated with specialist 
proactive police investigations (see van Koppen et 
al. 2010a&b; Kleemans & de Poot, 2008). However 
the invisibility and danger surrounding data 
collection, combined with the transparency of the 
police process continues to make it the main source 
for studies. Indeed in the UK, where resources in 
policing have been significantly reduced, offenders 
are subjected to a considered review across 
numerous criteria, prior to being placed on the 
national organised crime database (Tusikov, 
2012:102). 
 
The details surrounding the OC suspects were coded 
to allow for anonymity. As the Forces concerned had 
different methods of collecting information the 
details provided were not always identical for both 
areas. The qualitative element of the study utilised 
open-ended questionnaires completed by 4 Police 
Officers (R1 – R4), as well as 7 community safety 
partners (R5 – R11), within Force 1. All respondents 
were volunteers and provided informed consent. 
Jick (1979) argues that using both qualitative and 
quantitative data can compliment each other to 
provide a stronger methodological design. It can also 
improve evaluation by allowing the limitations of 
one data source to be offset by the strengths of 
another to enrich the study (Sarantakos, 2005:50). 
 
Findings 
This section will be described in three sections. First, 
it will examine and compare the demographics of 
the Organised Crime offender sample in both Force 
areas. It will then compare the intervention 
methods, before examining the outcomes each 
Force achieved.  
 
The two groups of Organised Crime Suspects 
Table 1 below provides an overview of the groups of 
organised crime suspects from both Force areas. The 
table shows a number of similarities, with the 
offenders being predominantly male with a similar 36  
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average age (39 and 37 years respectively), which is 
older than general offenders. The individuals from 
both groups also display a high average number of 
previous convictions.  
 
Table 1: General description of suspects from both 
Police Force areas. 
Variable Study 1 (38 
suspects) 
Study 2 (62 
suspects) 
Male 89% 87% 
Age range 26 – 65yrs 
(mean 39 years) 
17-62 yrs (mean 
37 years) 
White British   47.3% 100% 
Suspects with 
previous 
convictions 
89% 92% 
Previous 
conviction range 
0-27 (mean 9) 0 – 47 (mean 
14) 
 
Perhaps the most significant difference, when 
comparing the samples, is in relation to ethnicity. In 
Force 1 the group are exclusively white British, 
whilst in Force 2 there is more diversity. In the latter 
area, seven  (19%) of the suspects originate from 
Afghanistan and six (16%) from the Indian sub 
continent. Individuals from each group showed a 
certain degree of domestic stability. In Force 1 the 
majority (74%) live with a partner and/ or children, 
with three of the females being partners of other 
male suspects being targeted. Of the 38 (58%) of 
subjects employed in the Force 2 sample, there were 
ten business owner/ directors (16%), two of whom 
were self employed (3%), with eight (13%) involved 
in driver related businesses.  
 
Turning to criminal career history, overall only nine 
offenders (9%) showed no prior convictions. In Force 
1, this related to four (11%) individuals, albeit two of 
these were pending trial and one had previously 
been acquitted. Similarly in Force 2 this included five 
offenders (8.1%), although all had experienced 
unsuccessful prosecutions. The majority of the 
sample did exhibit previous convictions, in Force 1 
the range was from 0 - 27 prior convictions, whilst 
those in Force 2, from 0 - 45. In Force 1 the age at 
first conviction varied from 12 to 44 years (mean 18 
years), with 22 (56%) of the individuals (56%) 
receiving their first conviction prior to 20 years. The 
most common first offence relates to dishonesty 
with 47% being convicted of theft, fraud, robbery, 
burglary or handling stolen goods. Violent crime 
(11%) was also prominent as a first conviction. In 
Force 2, over 30% of first sanctions related to 
dishonesty (including burglary, shoplifting and theft 
from both motor vehicles and persons), with nearly 
13% of individuals convicted for multiple offences at 
their first appearance.  
 
Overall the career history of these OC suspects 
shows significant diversity. In Force 1, 79% of 
suspects show a prior conviction for dishonesty, 
followed by violence (53%), traffic offences (50%), 
drugs (47%), public disorder (24%), firearms/ 
weapons (24%), taking a motor vehicle (21%), 
criminal damage (9%), or other offences (15%). It is 
also worthy of note that whilst the first sanction for 
5% of individuals was a drug offence, nearly half of 
the individuals went on to commit drug related 
offences at some later point in their criminal career. 
Traffic offences were not present in first convictions 
although they may have become more common as 
the individual became older and had increased 
accessibility to vehicles.   
 
 
 
Interventions 
In both studies intelligence relating to the suspects 
primarily came from Police Officers, other 
organisations (e.g. port authorities, local 
government), or the public (general information, 
registered informants, Crimestoppers confidential 
‘phone line).  
The integration of partners appeared important to 
both Police areas, who were strong advocates of 37  
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using a multi-agency approach to tackle organised 
crime. The range of partners was wide; as an 
example one OCG received attention from nine 
partner agencies. These included: Department for 
Environment, Vehicle and Operator Services Agency 
(VOSA), Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), 
Environment Agency, Local Authority Building 
Control (LABC). Other often used agencies included: 
National Crime Agency, Local government officers 
(including Anti-Social Behaviour Officers, Housing 
Officers), Crown Prosecution Service, Border 
agency, and Housing Authority/Landlords 
Association.  
 
Partners also played a central role in managing and 
coordinating the process. The police area in Force 1, 
had an operational multi agency team embedded in 
the Police building. Here, police and partners met as 
a joint panel to agree objectives, priorities and 
tactics. Force 2 took a more formal and structured 
approach, using the Gold, Silver Bronze method. This 
hierarchical structure is used consistently by UK 
police forces in both reactive and proactive 
environments. At Gold level a senior police officer 
maintains a strategic overview and liaises with 
counterparts from other agencies. The Silver 
commander is then responsible for defining the 
tactics to be used against the suspect(s), whilst the 
Bronze commander is responsible for the effective 
implementation of those tactics. This approach 
allows for clear accountability, allowing any 
concerns regarding  strategy or implementation to 
be readily identified and remedied.  
 
The period for targeting the organised crime 
offenders appeared similar across the two areas. In 
Force 1 this ranged between one week (when 
specific information allowed a swift intervention), to 
three years, with the most common intervention 
period lasting either 6-12 months (26%) or 2-3 years 
(30%). In Force 2 the interventions lasted between 
three months and five years, the average time being 
27 months. Explanations for the difference in time 
included problems surrounding the gathering of 
intelligence, coordinating partner activities, and a 
lengthy criminal justice process. 
 
Force 1 and 2, used many similar interventions, such 
as interviews, arrests, as well as executing warrants 
at home and business addresses. There was also 
considerable use of partnership agency powers, 
with housing agency evictions and benefit fraud 
team sanctions regularly observed. However the 
two Police Forces did exhibit a different emphasis in 
their approach. First, whilst Force 1 maintained 
secrecy in their operations, Force 2 openly told the 
suspects they were being targeted because there 
was intelligence associating them with the 
commission of organised crime. Secondly, Force 1 
placed significant emphasis on following the money 
and took advantage of the powers provided by the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, to restrain assets of 
those who had become wealthy by illegitimate 
means. Interventions tended to follow this 
approach, so in Force 1 suspect premises were 
searched in 95% of cases; financial investigation was 
conducted in 74% of cases; financial assets 
restrained in 37%; forced closure of business in 13%; 
evictions or homes seized in 11% of cases; and 
deportation used in one case (2%). In contrast Force 
2 showed a more flexible and transparent approach, 
tailoring interventions to specific OCGs. The data 
showed various activity in relation to individual 
OCGs ranging from 1 to 29 interventions (mean 
11.5), which could be placed on a continuum 
between overt and low level interventions, to covert 
and more invasive interventions. In Force 2, 
suspects were routinely challenged regarding their 
behaviour and a zero tolerance approach applied to 
low level offences. Here fixed penalty tickets or 
prosecutions for minor offences were common, as 
was the use of search warrants. In Force 2 the most 
popular intervention was arrest (37%), with some of 
the individuals facing multiple arrests for numerous 38  
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offences. External agencies were also used in a wide 
range of activity – for example the Environment 
Agency were used to prosecute OCG members for 
illegal tipping, whilst insurance companies took 
action in relation to fraudulent claims.  
 
Outcomes 
Evaluating the impact policing interventions have in 
relation to organised crime is a complex issue 
(MacKenzie & Hamilton-Smith, 2011), and neither of 
the Police Forces had an explicit evaluation process 
in place. An outcome measure was articulated by 
Force 1 (in relation to public confidence), although 
this wasn’t measured. As previously highlighted the 
nationally co-ordinated OCG Mapping process 
generates a numerical threat score for each OCG, 
which is centrally recorded. Superficially this 
presents one simple method of assessment – the 
threat score of the OCG before and after disruption 
activity. However, whilst useful, this assessment 
involves a significant level of subjectivity, relying on 
the quality of intelligence gathered as well as the 
professional judgement to interpret that 
intelligence. So, as an example, if an individual 
receives a criminal conviction their threat would 
probably be reduced - even though they could be 
released after a short period of incarceration or 
even facilitate operations from prison. This was 
specifically observed with Force 2, who used the 
threat score as a means to examine progress and to 
archive the OCG when no longer thought to be a 
threat. However a later follow up of archived OCGs 
(average 15 months), showed a third had re-
offended. 
 
In Force 1, as the emphasis was on the Proceeds of 
Crime Act, a number of clear performance measures 
were apparent. There was a 63% conviction rate 
present, however when pending cases were 
included 92% of subjects targeted would be 
prosecuted. These prosecutions primarily focus on 
fraud, possession of counterfeit goods and the 
supply of controlled substances. Indeed in Force 1, 
24% of cases drugs were found and seized and in 
37% of cases financial assets were restrained, 
varying between £18,000 and £175,000. Other 
financial assets seized included homes or business 
premises. Indeed, overall Force 1 reported that in 
the previous two years the approach had seized 
£536,875, recovered £612, 434 in assets and over 
£1.33 million in illicit drugs, restraining and 
removing 17 houses from their occupants (although 
this data wasn’t available for researchers to verify). 
39% of the subjects were provided with prison 
sentences, ranging from 2 months to 11 years. It also 
led to many HMRC (n=9) and benefit fraud (n=183) 
referrals relating to family members and contacts of 
the targeted individuals. 
 
Practitioner opinion 
During discussions with managers and practitioners 
across the two police areas the question of legality 
regularly came up and received a consistent reply. 
Senior officers stated legal advice had confirmed 
their actions were lawful and although some 
suspects threatened legal action (citing harassment 
or contravention of the Human Rights Act), this was 
never progressed. The officers argued that their 
process for identifying these individuals, as posing a 
criminal threat, was transparent and evidence 
based, being resilient to any legal challenge. 
 
All respondents from the questionnaires stated the 
disruption approach was a success. Police 
respondents felt the new approach was more 
dynamic and responsive, highlighting ‘notable 
successes against Organised Crime affiliated 
individuals’ (R1). The opinion was that partnership 
working allowed the investigations to be 
‘progressed quicker and more thoroughly’ often 
because of the ‘greatly improved communication 
between agencies’(R2). One respondent stating that 
all the staff involved ‘work well together for the 
same objectives’ (R7), albeit there was a feeling the 39  
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police had a tendency to take lead.  Indeed six of the 
seven partner respondents felt working in the same 
office as the police practitioners allowed for more 
effective and efficient information sharing.  and 
another commented that ‘having the information at 
your fingertips’ was the ‘key to the operations 
success’ (R8). Some problems and limitations of the 
operation were noted, such as  restrictions on 
obtaining information due to legislation (R2). A small 
number highlighted ‘initial teething problems’, 
which had been overcome through joint working 
(R1, R2,R10, R11). Practitioners also felt their 
professionalism had improved. R4 suggested that 
the operation had expanded knowledge of the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, which had led to 
improved performance. Community safety partners 
also stated that the operation was successful 
because there were ‘more resources available to 
council officers, such as having assistance with 
arrest, search and seizure and analysis of mobile 
phones’ (R7). There was some limited criticism that 
some partners commenting that the ‘police 
response can be slow at times to requests’ (R5) and 
other partners such as Trading Standards and HMRC 
‘do not fully embrace the partnership’ (R7). 
However on the whole, responses from both parties 
with regards to the partnership were positive. 
 
Discussion 
The global proliferation of organised crime has 
caused governments to look at more creative and 
effective means to tackle the phenomenon. One 
new approach has revolved around disruption and 
this study has examined how two police forces have 
engaged in this process. Initial assessment showed 
that both Force areas were dealing with similar 
offender samples, which were also consistent with a 
wider UK study on OC profiles that showed this type 
of offender exhibited, ‘less of the prolific, impulsive 
and chaotic offending behaviour in organised 
criminals in comparison to other persistent 
offenders’ (Francis et al., 2013:38). Both groups 
within the study were predominantly male, and had 
more mature offenders, who showed a high level of 
recidivism, Perhaps the biggest difference between 
the groups was that Force 2 had a much wider 
ethnically diverse group, which was no doubt due to 
their urban status (ONS, 2013).  
 
The disruption approach allowed both Forces to 
concentrate on the offender, albeit encouraging a 
more flexible approach to reducing criminal 
behaviour through any legitimate means at their 
disposal. This approach is built on the presumption 
that highly prolific offenders will misbehave in other 
areas of their public and private life – leaving them 
vulnerable to a wide variety of interventions. This 
emphasises the importance of partners, who have a 
wider access to information and intervention 
options. However, notwithstanding these benefits, 
the Police still have significant discretion as to how 
they implement a disruption approach.  
 
Interestingly the two Forces exhibited different 
attitudes in relation to the level of secrecy. Police 
Officers associated with Force 1 were of the opinion 
that secrecy would lead to more effective 
interventions. The rationale being if suspects were 
unaware they were being targeted they could be 
caught offguard. Conversely targets from Force 2 
were informed that they would continue being 
targeted by the Police whilst they pursued their 
criminality. As Kennedy (2009:2) argues, deterrence 
theory relies on the offender perceiving an 
increased risk of sanction, and the ‘stiffer, quicker 
and more reliable the penalty, the less attractive the 
act will become’. Without this perception the 
deterrent effectis diluted. On more general terms 
the two Forces appeared to emphasise different 
approaches. Force 1 focused on the use of the 
‘strengthened powers to attack and seize criminal 
assets’ provided by the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 
(Home Office, 2013), whilst Force 2 used a more 
40  
The Journal of Political Criminology, ISSN: 2059-9595 Volume 1 Number 1, December 2015, pp.33-44  
diverse range of interventions that adapted to 
opportunities presented by the offender’s lifestyle.  
 
It is clear that the respondents felt the overall 
approach, specifically partnership working, to be a 
success - although this was generated from an 
internal, rather than external perspective. 
Community safety partners were used in 92% of 
targeting interventions within Force 1, and all of the 
targets within Force 2. Questionnaire responses 
showed that sharing of information and enhanced 
understanding between partners, largely 
contributed to the success of the approach. As Berry 
et al. (2011) suggests the partners appeared to 
employ a ‘cooperative relationship in order to 
achieve a common goal’  
 
In essence the disruption appears a more dynamic 
approach, however both Forces predominantly used 
traditional methods in relation to their 
interventions. As such the use of search warrants 
and arrests were commonplace across both areas. 
Further, the period for the targeting operation could 
be lengthy. In Force 1, 52% of target investigations 
were brought to their conclusion within 12 months, 
whilst 30% of the interventions took between 2 to 3 
years to conclude. This was similar to Force 2, where 
the mean period for targeting was 26 months. The 
reasons for this varied due to the complexity 
surrounding communication and cooperation with 
other agencies, and the time taken by the Criminal 
Justice System.  
 
However judging whether the approach is a success, 
outside the views of practitioners engaged in the 
process is more difficult to establish. When 
assessing outcomes both studies focused on a 
number of different issues. For example Force 1 
relied on more traditional police outcome measures, 
showing that 39% of targets had been given a prison 
sentence. This is arguably a positive outcome as 
removing offenders from society is an effective 
method of disrupting their organised crime and, for 
the duration of their prison stay, prevents them 
from committing further offences. However, even in 
Force 1, who focused on prosecution, this outcome 
does not apply to 61% of the targets as many were 
given suspended sentences or a community order. 
Further long term desistance is more difficult to 
establish. In Force 1, follow up information was only 
available for five of the 38 targets (13%), however 
two of these had been subjected to new 
investigations and three had since been convicted of 
further minor offences. Of these five, three had 
initially received suspended sentences, one had 
received the shortest prison sentence of two 
months and one had been acquitted. A tentative 
hypothesis is that shorter sentences appear 
relatively ineffective at stopping OC, with any 
disruption only occurring for a short period of time. 
A similar finding was disclosed in Force 2, where a 
third of the individuals had been prosecuted within 
(on average) 15.5 months, even though they were 
thought not to present a threat. As such the concept 
of success remains ambiguous and would benefit 
from further research and academic scrutiny. 
 
 
Conclusion 
A disruption approach is something that has been 
given a high priority in relation to tackling organised 
crime. However there is very little guidance in terms 
of how this should be applied systematically. As 
such, it is at the discretion of individual Police 
Forces, or operational areas, as to how this 
approach should be implemented. In this study 
Force 1 has concentrated on covert investigation 
which emphasises the investigation of assets, in 
relation to the target and immediate family. 
Conversely Force 2 has taken a more transparent 
and flexible approach - informing the individuals 
they will be targeted until they desist offending. 
They then seek to use intervention opportunities to 
guide their approach, constantly evaluating the 41  
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impact these have on the offending potential of the 
OCG.  
 
Practitioners overwhelmingly supported the 
approach and were convinced of its impact, 
although more substantive quantitative assessment 
proved evasive with this limited study. Although the 
level of prevention is not yet proven it can at least 
be stated that the approach visibly engages with the 
offenders and at some level disrupts their criminal 
lifestyle. So, assessing success is difficult. If a high 
prosecution rate is ‘what works’ then Force 1 can be 
thought of as successful. However with such prolific 
offenders the disruption a conviction can have may 
be minimal (dependant on the period incarcerated). 
In fact a significant number of the offenders (if not 
incarcerated) do appear to reoffend. The overall 
pattern of reoffending could only be analysed 
following a longer follow up period. Study 2, which 
allowed a further assessment after the organised 
crime offenders were judged to be no longer a 
threat. Of these offenders nineteen (33.9%) were 
prosecuted for further crimes, on average a period 
of 15.5 months later. 
 
In summary, although disruption is heavily aligned 
with enforcement and prosecution the process is 
tangibly different as it opens itself up partnership 
intelligence and intervention - allowing more 
innovative ways to make the environment hostile to 
offender criminality. Rather than investigating them 
for their suspected substantive organised crime 
offence they intervene in relation to their lifestyle 
on the presumption that further offending (criminal 
or civil) will be found. However whilst the principle 
may be universal that Police Forces have discretion 
as to how this approach can be delivered, as this 
analysis shows these approaches are not consistent. 
Further research is needed to provide clearer 
guidelines.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Questions to police officers, Force 1 
 
Your Police role:  
Length of service:  
1)  Do you feel the Operation is a success? 
2) If you do, why? 
3)  What, do you feel, could be improved about 
the Operation?  
4)  What is your experience of working with 
partners? 
5) How would you describe the cooperation 
among partners? 
6) Have any specific problems been faced? 
 
 
Questions to Community Safety partners, 
Force 1 
Current role: 
Length of service with your current employee: 
1) How do you feel working in the same office 
as Police Practitioners affects the Operation? 
2) How do you find cooperation among 
partners? 
3) Have any problems been experienced? 
4) Do you feel the Operation is a success? 
5) If so, why? 
6) What, do you feel, could be improved about 
the Operation?
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